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CARING FOR JusncE. By Robin West. New York: New York Uni­
versity Press. 1997. Pp. ix, 356. $35. 
If the sexes are indeed from different planets, as the title of a 
recent bestseller informs us,1 one wonders what those planets were 
like before their inhabitants made the trek to Earth. Did the citi­
zens of the all-female Venus structure their lives, work, moral com­
mitments, and political systems differently from the males over on 
Mars? If so, what happened when these cultural worlds collided to 
form our own? Does our culture represent a synthesis of these two 
separate systems into a new and better, or perhaps worse, one, or is 
it the result of one planet's wholesale conquest of the other? 
Fanciful as these questions may seem, they raise serious issues 
relating to the most fundamental aspects of our personal interac­
tions and political institutions. In her latest book, Caring for 
Justice, Robin West2 sets herself the task of asking and answering a 
version of these questions, and exploring the implications of the an­
swers she adopts. Or rather, such is her task in part of the book, for 
Caring for Justice is not truly a book - in the sense of a single work 
devoted to a central thesis - but a collection of essays whose rela­
tion to one another frequently seems tangential. Only the first two 
chapters explore the work's stated themes in depth.3 Later chapters 
sometimes suggest peripheral elements of prior discussions, but 
they generally fail to establish explicit connections or to build on 
the earlier material.4 The totality of Caring for Justice ultimately is 
precisely equal to the sum of its parts, as those parts do not interact 
meaningfully in a way that would enhance their collective impact. 
That being said, the parts themselves are excellent. Caring for 
Justice is the rare work that offers a clear map of the current aca­
demic landscape as well -as a provocative foray into new territory. 
If the book steps lightly and moves quickly, at least it manages to 
cover a lot of ground. West describes and critiques entire schools of 
j urisprudence - l aw and e conomics, law and literature, 
postmodernism and, of course, various strains of thought falling 
under the clumsy catchall term feminism - both concisely and 
precisely. 
1. See JoHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARs, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS: A PRACTICAL 
GumE FOR IMPROVING COMMUNICATION AND GETrING WHAT You WANT 1N YouR RELA· 
TIONSHIPS (1992). 
2. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
3. West herself adinits that "[t]he first two chapters . . .  present the book's core jurispru­
dential arguments." P. 9. 
4. Where possible, this Notice attempts to make the implicit relationships among the 
book's chapters more overt. 
1884 
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ASSUMPTIONS AND FOUNDATIONS 
Before starting her journey, West packs - and also unpacks -
some fairly weighty intellectual baggage. The book starts from the 
premise that our society, and more particularly our legal system, 
reflects and represents the unfortunate triumph of "male" over "fe­
male" morality. The former perspective, which has come to domi­
nate Western political philosophy, posits "a society and state the 
raison d'etre of which is the satisfaction of the interests, prefer­
ences, wishes, desires, and whims of . . .  atomized individuals" (pp. 
4-5). West, following Carol Gilligan and others, calls this moral 
view the ethic of justice (p. 23). "Female" morality, or the ethic of 
care (p. 6), is grounded in "connections to others" (p. 1) rather than 
in the pursuit of individual interests. This ethic is "embedded in the 
female labor of attending to intimate relations" (p. 6). 
Although "more than any other experience we share" (p. 1), the 
relationships to which the ethic of care devotes itself "inform and 
constitute our 'moral sense"' (p. 1), our legal system frequently op­
erates to undermine rather than to support them.5 This institu­
tional neglect of, and opposition to, the ethic of care "is all a 
function of our sorry history of sexist exclusion" (p. 7). These state­
ments reflect the two overtly expressed premises that underlie the 
remainder of West's discussion. The first premise states that there 
is an ethic of care - that is, "that the work, disproportionately 
done by women, of caring for the relationships that sustain us, is 
moral work, rather than emotional affect" (p. 7). Relationships of 
care fall within the category of moral activity as squarely as autono­
mous, rational ethical choices do. They should not be dismissed as 
merely natural or intuitive female behavior without regard to this 
moral component. The second premise is "that women, as a group, 
have been subordinated in this culture, rather than simply 'discrimi­
nated against' by the state" (p. 7). 
West later advocates greater incorporation of the ethic of care 
into our legal decisionmaking processes. Before addressing the 
merits of the ethic of care, however, West must acknowledge, and 
attempt to defuse, the potential controversy surrounding her mere 
declaration of its existence. Other scholars -'- many, perhaps most, 
of them feminists - have vigorously contested the proposition that 
there are essential differences between men and women.6 Yet both 
of West's premises are grounded in the assertion of such categorical 
differences: "They both seek to express something generally true of 
all women and hence of each woman" (p. 10). West notes four ba-
5. "[T]he good connections - such as the sustaining and nurturing connections in a 
healthy parent-child relationship - are not sufficiently protected, and at times are actually 
threatened, by our public and legal institutions . . . .  " P. 2. 
6. P. 10. West does not identify particular scholars who have made such objections. 
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sic categories of objection to her essentialist claims: first, an empiri­
cal denial that anything meaningful can be said of a sex generally; 
second, a strategic objection, grounded in the postmodern sensibil­
ity, that finds the truth or falsity of West's claims irrelevant but con­
tends that such claims are politically unhelpful - if not downright 
dangerous - for women;7 third, a political opposition to an over­
simplified focus on sexism that ignores or downplays the complex 
matrix of types of discrimination simultaneously faced by, for exam­
ple, African-American women or lesbians; and finally, the potential 
backlash from the male counterargument that men's essential bio­
logical differences from women may drive their misogynist behavior 
(pp. 11-13). 
West answers these objections in reverse order. Responding to 
the backlash concern, she basically claims that biology is not 
destiny, so men get nowhere by cloaking their immoral behavior in 
the inevitability of genetics. To the political argument, which she 
considers the most serious, West replies that even if some women 
confront subordination along several axes at once - such as ra­
cism, sexism, and heterosexism - sexism is certainly one of these 
axes, and all women face discrimination along that axis. It is there­
fore not meaningless or inaccurate to describe sexism as a universal, 
however complicated, female experience. For her rejection of 
postmodernism, West summons some bile. She labels it "constitu­
tively anti-Darwinian, anti-naturalist and anti-scientific" (p. 16), an 
"at bottom inhuman" philosophy that transforms priceless ideas 
into fungible commodities and that "will surely diminish us" (p. 17). 
The empirical objection to essentialism, though not considered 
the most significant by West, causes her the most trouble. First, she 
backpedals a little to concede that there is "no ironclad correspon­
dence between women and 'an orientation toward an ethic of care"' 
(p. 18). Then she claims, albeit not unconvincingly, that the anties­
sentialists should bear the "burden of proof" on this empirical ques­
tion. 8 Finally, and most persuasively, she attacks the moral 
intuition that gives the empirical objection force: the visceral 
unease one feels at the prospect of stereotyping morality, or any­
thing else, by sex. Her attack upholds the standard of free intellec­
tual discourse, arguing that "[t]here is a real danger of cutting off 
fruitful inquiry if we cut off inquiry into sex and gender differences 
solely out of worries over stereotyping" (p. 19). West points out 
7. West raises and confronts a similar objection in Chapter 1. Pp. 36-37. 
8. Pp. 18-19. West relies on Carol Gilligan in making this claim. "It truly would be ex­
tremely odd, as [Gilligan] argued, if it turned out that the vastly greater amount of child 
raising and homekeeping, the world over and throughout history, in which women engage -
a fact apparently conceded by all - has no impact whatsoever on the moral orientations of 
the two sexes." P. 18 (citing Carol Gilligan, Reply to Critics, in AN ETHIC OF CARE: FEMI· 
NIST AND lNrERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 207 (Mary Jeanne Larrabee ed., 1993)). 
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that whatever philosophical legitimacy the ethic of care possesses 
exists independently of its biological or historical provenance. Yet 
even if it is not theoretically necessary, she somewhat tentatively 
asserts, linking the ethic of care to the experiences of women may 
have strategic utility. West seems to be doing little more here than 
requesting an opportunity to state her case. 
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF JUSTICE AND CARE 
That case begins with the argument, in Chapter One, that our 
system of justice undervalues the dictates of the nurturing, con­
nected ethic of care. The erection of such an opposition between 
particularized �are and universalized justice, and the rejection of 
the former in favor of the latter, is of course hardly new to Western 
political philosophy . .  After all, Plato's Republic, our first extended 
treatment of the subject, envisions an ideally just society that not 
only condones but demands the separation of parents from their 
children.9 
West is not so bold as to say that care is more important than 
justice or should supplant it as a basis for legal decisionmaking. In­
stead, she claims that the ethics of justice and care are both neces­
sary conditions of any desirable legal regime and, perhaps more 
intriguingly, "are each necessary conditions of the other. . . . 
'[J]ustice must be caring if it is to be just, and . . .  caring must be just 
if it is to be caring"' (p. 24). West presents this argument in a nega­
tive fashion by indicating the unsatisfactory results that occur when 
either ethic is pursued independently of the other. 
West does not precisely define the terms justice and care. In­
stead, she describes them by appealing to three archetypal images 
associated with each. In explicating justice, West points to the 
"plumb line" of consistency that tests if our acts are "on the level," 
the "cupped hands" of integrity that hold one's personal oaths 
close,10 and the scales of impartiality that are held by' the blind­
folded judge.11 As icons of caring, West cites a mother's nurturing 
embrace of her infant, the compassionate tears of a witness to trag­
edy, and the particular, focused gaze of the caregiver on the object 
of her care.12 In adopting this "imagistic" format, West's analysis 
gains a great deal of immediacy and accessibility but sacrifices intel-
9. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO Bk. 5, at 457a-466c {Allan Bloom trans., Basic 
Books 2d ed. 1991). 
10. This image might not spring to mind immediately when one considers the iconogra­
phy of justice. West has not merely fabricated this conception of justice, however; it is drawn 
from literature. P. 26 (citing RoBERT BoLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1962)). 
11. P. 26 (referring to WILLIAM BYRON, QUADRANGLE CoNSIDERATIONS 108-10 (1989)). 
12. Again, West is borrowing the last of these images, this time from a popular motion 
picture. P. 31 (citing ALIENS (Twentieth-Century Fox 1986)). 
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lectual rigor. Indeed, West herself later admits that two of her 
images of justice, consistency and impartiality, basically blend to­
gether into the straightforward notion of treating like cases alike (p. 
8 9). 
West pairs off these images, matching consistency with nur­
turance, integrity with compassion, and impartiality with particular­
ity.1 3 Using case law, historical anecdotes, and literary examples, 
she then argues that none of the aspects of justice is truly just unless 
its caring counterpart is present, and vice versa. Integrity without 
compassion becomes coldhearted, and unjust, adherence to abstract 
principles, as when Melville's Captain Vere ruthlessly and need­
lessly convicts Billy Budd. 14 Compassion without integrity, on the 
other hand, devolves into a dangerously literal "selflessness" rooted 
"not in a genuinely empathic regard for the other, but rather in a 
harmful and injurious lack of regard for oneself" (p. 7 9). Impartial­
ity without particularity leads courts to follow an overly formalistic 
sense of equality in deciding cases that, in their specific details, are 
very different. Particularity without impartiality defers unduly to 
the needs even of the undeserving - an argument West supports by 
reference to the Supreme Court's acceptance of reverse discrimina­
tion claims (pp. 85- 87). Consistency without nurturance breeds 
procrustean egalitarianism; West provocatively cites Rawls's theory 
of justice (pp. 62-65) and what she considers a misguided justifica­
tion for abortion rights (pp. 66-70) as examples. Nurturance with­
out consistency prioritizes care toward "one's own" and "shades 
into racism, nationalism, tribalism, or speciesism - in short, into 
fascism" (p. 75). 
By the end of Chapter One, the reader has begun speculating as 
to the extent to which the justice-care dichotomy parallels other dis­
tinctions already known to the law: for example, between legal and 
factual questions or between procedure and substance. In the final 
analysis, is care nothing more than paying close attention to the 
particularized facts of the case in order to achieve a robust under­
standing of what law to apply? West writes, "[I]f judges are to iden­
tify 'likes' and treat them 'alike[,]' they must be able to understand 
the shared qualities of certain experiences which on their surface 
may appear to be quite different indeed" (p. 8 9). Is justice merely a 
formal set of rules that are a necessary adjunct to the codification of 
our substantive, caring values? West writes, "The work of doing 
legal justice - of remaining true to a judicial oath, of applying the 
13. The basis for this particular set of comparisons is unclear, as, indeed, is the basis for 
establishing pairwise comparisons in the first place. Presumably West does this to make the 
mutual reliance of justice and care more immediate and accessible. 
14. Pp. 43-44 {discussing HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY Buoo, SAILOR (Harrison Hayford 
& Merton M. Sealts, Jr. eds., University of Chicago Press 1962) {1891)). 
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law, of treating like cases alike, of insisting on institutional consis­
tency, and so on - must be in the service of values which are life­
affirming" (p. 49). It may be the case that neither care nor justice is 
absent from our jurisprudence, but that judges must struggle in 
close cases even to discern these ethics' dictates, much less strike a 
balance between hard rule and tender mercy. 
At any rate, West does not offer an exhaustive account of the 
relationship between justice and care or of how best to harmonize 
the two, either in the abstract or in terms of their practical applica­
tion. West's imagistic explanations of the concepts of justice and 
care leave the definitions of the terms themselves ambiguous, com­
pounding the difficulty of understanding the ways in which they in­
teract. Depending on one's own understanding of these terms, it is 
possible to see their harmonization as either automatic or impossi­
ble. For example, perhaps the basic mission of justice is to form 
universal precepts that categorize, and may resolve conflicts among, 
those caring impulses that are "very likely the root of whatever 
moral obligations we eventually learn to assume toward all others" 
(p. 71). That is to say, the project of justice may, at its crux, be 
nothing more than the extension of the rules that govern intimate, 
caring relationships from the private sphere into the social realm. 
Under this conception, West's thesis that justice and care are linked · 
needs no argument, for it follows from the very definition of justice 
itself. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that a richer understanding 
of justice and care will lead to the conclusion that they are, at least 
sometimes, incompatible. There is no reason to suppose justice and 
care will never conflict, nor must we accept unreservedly West's 
claim that they are always mutually dependent. In fact, some of 
West's attempts to illustrate the horrors of justice without care indi­
cate this. For example, despite West's casual characterization of the 
act as "repugnant," the father who places the needs of the commu­
nity over the needs of his son (p. 51) has not done anything wrong 
- just as the boy's mother does nothing wrong in making the oppo­
site choice. The father has merely chosen one of two possible re­
sponses to a legitimate moral dilemma.15 Indeed, it will likely be 
the case that care alone will sometimes place mutually exclusive, 
though independently desirable, demands on individuals or groups. 
15. As in this case, West sometimes assumes too readily that the moral intuitions driving 
her opposition to certain actions are widely shared and need no justification. For example, 
West appears to take it for granted that Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son Isaac on 
the altar of God was morally reprehensible. Pp. 40, 51. This may be true, but it is by no 
means indisputably so. Many devout believers, including one major Western philosopher, 
take this sign of devotion to be the defining moral act in the life of the "father of faith." See 
generally S¢REN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING (Alastair Hannay trans., 1985). 
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Justice and care may both be good things, but that does not mean 
they will always be reconcilable.16 
To note that certain elements of West's conceptual framework 
remain undeveloped is not to slight West's contribution in Chapter 
One. Indeed, that the reader is left asking such questions, and curi­
ous about their answers, is an indication of the power of West's 
thesis to engage and stimulate. West's project in these pages is 
more descriptive than prescriptive: she seeks to highlight the sys­
tem's improper prioritization of justice over care to the detriment 
of both, not to give the final word on how that system might prop­
erly synthesize the two. One is left hoping, however, that this will 
not prove to be her final word on the subject. 
JUSTICE AND HARM 
Chapter Two contains the most intellectually and emotionally 
gripping material in Caring for Justice. In this chapter, West argues 
that the systematic prioritization of justice over care has affected 
our legal decisionmaking processes. The ethic of justice promotes a 
norm of "formal equality" that has led to a truncated understanding 
of the types of harm our legal institutions should prevent or com­
pensate (p. 98). West contends that the law and economics school 
has co-opted the legal notion of harm and replaced it with the no­
tion of cost.17 This conceptual transformation has had disastrous 
consequences for women (p. 96). West devotes the remainder of 
the chapter to an elaboration of significant harms, visited dispro­
portionately if not exclusively on women, that warrant redress but 
do not conform to the modem economic notion of harm as cost. 
Caring for Justice is nowhere more eloquent or moving than 
here. West provides a grim depiction of the very real and immedi­
ate harm the specter of rape inflicts on all women everywhere (pp. 
101-07). She portrays women's acts of personal altruism in the do­
mestic sphere as a self-denying, harmful offshoot of female subordi­
nation to men (pp. 110-11). Women suffer harms of separation 
including not only childbirth and subsequent separations from chil­
dren but also the common isolation of the married woman from 
female companionship.18 Society imposes patriarchal harms that 
16. The notion that moral goods are frequently incompatible animates the work of Isaiah 
Berlin. See JoHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 6 {1996) ("[T]he cornerstone of [Berlin's] thought is 
his rejection of monism in ethics - his insistence that fundamental human values are many, 
that they are often in conflict and rarely, if ever, necessarily harmonious, and that some at 
least of these conflicts are among incommensurables - conflicts among values for which 
there is no single, common standard of measurement or arbitration."). 
17. P. 96. West devotes a later section of the chapter to an elaboration and repudiation of 
the assumptions underlying the Jaw and economics view. Pp. 164-74. 
18. Pp. 127-32. One might assert that men experience such harms as well; West claims 
that although this may be true, women suffer these harms disproportionately. For example, 
with respect to separation from one's children, West writes that "[a]lthough separation from 
May 1998] Caring for Justice 1891 
force women to provide men sexual gratification and domestic serv­
ices (pp. 134-35). 
This typology - and particularly the idea of altruism as harm -
brings a buried tension in West's analysis closer tO the surface. At 
times West implies that women's caregiving functions are deter­
mined, at least in part, by biology19 - a conception that explains 
West's need to justify her essentialist position in the Introduction. 
At other times, though, West hints that the assignment of those 
functions to women is a cultural construct,20 and an undesirable one 
at that. Sometimes West simply hedges, as when stating that 
"[n]ecessity - whether biological or cultural - becomes, for the 
mother, a moral imperative" (p. 118; emphasis added) . .  
But does it? Hardly anyone views acts undertaken of necessity 
as having moral heft. In fact, West herself argues that true moral 
agency demands autonomous choice, and she condemns patriarchy 
for denying women such choice by establishing subordinate female 
social roles that stunt their potential for individual fulfillment (p. 
122). Altruistic acts born of such duress, rather than authentic care, 
render women "incapable of the self-regarding acts that are consti­
tutive of the liberal self - and . . .  that is the harm that these [ altru­
istic] acts occasion" (p. 120). 
Ironically, this characterization of how women's externally im­
posed caregiving roles harm them is rooted in an acceptance of the 
same atomistic, self-interested economic notion of "the liberal self" 
that West initially claimed to reject: 
The case for both the efficiency and the morality of [female caregiv­
ing] rests, in effect, on the . assumption that the women who make 
these decisions are what might be called "self-possessed individuals" 
- individuals who choose, decide, and act on a solid, static core of 
settled preferences and desires, which are themselve,s grounded in 
either self-regarding pleasures and pains or freely chosen moral prin­
ciples. [p. 113] 
older children obviously might pain fathers as well as mothers, it seems to hurt mothers more 
and more often than fathers, in that the prospect of such a separation deters mothers more 
than fathers from income·producing activities which would require just such a separation." 
P. 128. 
19. For example, she cites women's unique, and biologically determined, role in nursing 
newborn children as an influence on women's caregiving roles. Pp. 117-18. 
20. "It does not follow . . .  that there is an essential or fundamental component of female 
altruism that is necessarily connected with fear, and necessarily harmful (any more than that 
there is an essential component of female altruism necessarily connected with care)." P. 123 
(second emphasis added). This statement does not comport easily with West's extended de­
fense of her essentialism in the Introduction. It also raises questions as to the ultimate foun­
dation of the ethic of care. That ethic, or at least its connection to a uniquely feminine 
viewpoint, initially seemed to draw support from the empirical fact of female caregiving. Yet 
if the two are not essentially linked and female altruism might just as easily have other bases, 
the ethic of care seems unable to rely on that altruism as an indicium of its authenticity. See 
infra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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But if the ethic of care is valid only insofar as the caregiver is a 
rational economic agent - if, in other words, women's aspirations 
and moral choices must ultimately remain accountable to the male 
vision of self-fulfillment - what is the value of the ethic of care? 
The source of its philosophical independence from the ethic of jus­
tice was that it prioritized relations of care over personal fulfill­
ment. Its central project was to defend the importance and 
desirability of sacrificing "self-regarding pleasures" for the benefit 
of someone else. Yet now West categorizes that sacrifice as a le­
gally neglected harm, and in so doing, advocates retaining the very 
focus on satisfying personal wants that she earlier described (pp. 4-
5) as the source of justice's carelessness. West claims that her "self­
possessed individual" standard "look[ s] beyond the definitional 
presumptions of both liberalism and of an ethic of care" (p. 113), 
but it looks more as if she is saying that the former is required to 
ratify the moral imperatives of the latter. That position tacitly pri­
oritizes justice over care as a moral criterion. 
The issue of priority is significant in the chronological as well as 
in the ordinal sense. Though West thoroughly describes the patriar­
chal origin of women's unique and inferior social status, she never 
adequately establishes the origin of women's unique moral perspec­
tive: the ethic of care. Later· in.the book, she claims that patriarchy 
is "a very general power matrix" that "exists across time and cul­
ture" (p. 282). She does not, however, fully respond to the crucial 
question of whether the maternal ethic similarly exists outside cul­
ture or whether it is a contingent, forced response to male 
dominance. 
This problem of precedence - does the ethic of care exist inde­
pendently, prior to male domination, or does it result therefrom? -
calls into question both the intellectual and the strategic compatibil­
ity of West's initial two premises: the principled vision of care as 
morality and the empirical fact of subjugation. Women's societal 
caregiving role is adequately explained by the existence either of an 
ethic of care rooted in women's essential difference from men or of 
male subjugation that requires women to define themselves entirely 
in terms of the satisfaction of others' needs.21 Why, then, are both 
21. West claims that this role is actually attributable to both factors: 
I have no doubt . . .  that . . .  (women's] large and small acts of self-sacrifice are emblem­
atic of a distinctive moral voice . . . . But it is also clear that that is not the entire 
story . . . .  (W]omen's inclination toward private or intimate altruism - particularly in 
the home - is also, many times and -in many ways, the measure of the harms such 
women have distinctively sustained. They originate not in an ethic of care but in self­
denigration, and reflect not a moral sensibility but a battered sense of self. 
Pp. 110-11. Yet it is impossible to separate these two causes. West does not, and almost 
certainly cannot, estimate how large a part of altruism is the result of morality as opposed to 
subordination. Indeed, as the cultural existence of this altruism can be explained satisfacto­
rily by West's analysis of male domination standing alone, Ockham's razor would slice away 
the need for an alternative ethic-of-care explanation altogether. 
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premises needed? The possibility that male oppression, and not a 
distinct a priori moral vision, determines women's caregiving role 
undermines the empirical basis for suspecting that an independent 
ethic of care exists. 
Moreover, taken together, these premises may tend to under­
mine the moral force of the ethic of care. Basing the ethic of care 
on women's caregiving relations when those relations result, at least 
in part, from male subjugation impeaches the moral validity of that 
ethic. Indeed, its perspective threatens to take on the visage of a 
Nietzschean slave morality rooted not in freestanding, autonomous 
moral choices or priorities, but in reaction, rationalization, and even 
spite.22 
West is not blind to these considerations. What, then, is she 
claiming here? There are several possibilities. Perhaps, notwith­
standing her prior resistance to an abstract rather than a sex-based 
foundation of the ethic of care (pp. 20-21), she is arguing for care as 
a universalizable moral principle. Whether or not a freely chosen 
or legitimate ethic of care currently exists - and West hints that it 
doesn't23 - such an ethic may be objectively desirable.24 
It is just as likely, however, that West's vision of the ethic of care 
extends to the distant past rather than merely looking to a possible 
future. An alternative, and likely more faithful, way to read West is 
to reconstruct a moral or historical account that might ground her 
understanding of female altruism as rooted both in the ethic of care 
and in male subjugation. Some version of a nurturing ethic of care, 
this interpretation posits, does exist outside our cultural constructs. 
At the same time, women's role in contemporary society is the re­
sult not only of that ethic itself, but also of men's exploitation of 
that ethic for their own benefit. The ethic of care has been cultur­
ally transformed into a maridate to provide caregiving that subordi­
nates women and excludes them entirely from the male project of 
self-directed choice and fulfillment.25 
22. See generally FRIEDRICH NIBIZScHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MoRALS (Douglas 
Smith trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1887). 
23. E.g., pp. 122-23 ("I have argued thus far that the altruism so often associated with 
femininity is in part, or oftentimes, grounded in a fully legitimate fear of either sexual inva­
sion, domestic abandonment, 9r both, and that when it is, the altruistic acts that follow should 
be recognized as harmful rather than ennobling for the woman who persistently engages in 
them."). 
24. E.g., p. 118 (positing a new set of community relations that "could surely be the basis 
for a robust morality of care - and if it ever becomes a cornerstone of public as well as 
private life, it will indeed be a morality quite different from the principled morality of respect 
premised upon independent, autonomous adults," but arguing that dependence rather than 
interdependence is the current basis of women's caregiving role). But cf. p. 125 ("I suspect, 
however, that no matter how we organize our social world, some of the psychic harms sus­
tained by the giving self would not be so easily deconstructed."). 
25. This reading of West, it must be noted, turns her statement at least partially on its 
head: a moral imperative becomes, for the mother, a necessity. That is to say, nurturing 
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LITERATURE, POSTMODERNISM, AND FEMINISM 
The final three chapters of the book, though interesting, are less 
ambitious than the first two. Chapter Three provides a useful pri­
mer on the law and literature movement. West identifies four sepa­
rate schools within that movement and briefly comments on the 
relation of each to her understanding of the feminist agenda. 1\vo 
of these schools undertake to connect legal and literary culture -
one in a positive, the other in an oppositional, way. The literary 
project, spearheaded by Professor James Boyd White, aims to res­
urrect "a conception of lawyering which has at its center a literary 
rather than an economic sensibility" (p. 181; emphasis deleted). 
West objects that as a tactical matter, this school's focus provides a 
poor engine for social reform (p. 187). Divorcing law from politics, 
as this movement suggests, is unproblematic only for those who 
don't need or want law to effect political change. Moreover, as a 
theoretical matter, lawyers simply aren't artists; they should strive 
to seek justice, not beauty (p. 188). More recent work within this 
school, most notably by Martha Nussbaum, contends that lawyers 
and legal institutions should look beyond themselves to the broad 
messages of culture to find insights into legal problems (pp. 188-89). 
West applauds this project's intentions, but warns that Western cul­
ture might tend toward the same racist, sexist, rationalist biases as 
Western law (p. 190). 
The critical project, whose exponents include Richard Weisberg 
and David Luban, seeks to mine the literary landscape for material 
with which to oppose the current authority of law. Though again 
displaying some sympathy for this project, West questions the via­
bility of using canonical works to critique social institutions, as 
those works themselves, even when critical, usually - and perhaps 
inevitably (pp. 196-97) - are written from the viewpont of social 
"insiders." 
The other two schools are not concerned with literary works 
themselves, but with certain literary sensibilities. The interpretive 
project uses the tools of literary criticism rather than literature per 
se. Adherents of the interpretive project assert that these tools 
should offer useful analytic guidance in the interpretation of legal 
relationships may originally have been - and might someday again be - rooted in autono· 
mous female moral choice. Male oppression, however, has exploited that moral activity and 
institutionalized it into a social mandate, to some extent subverting its moral component. 
This explanation also might run into the backlash argument anticipated by West in the 
Introduction. If women's caregiving role is grounded in biology, that argument would claim, 
so too might male exploitation of that role arise from a natural and inevitable biological 
impulse. West could easily counter, though - as she did in the Introduction - that this 
response may be natural, but it is not inevitable. With any luck, in fact, West's unearthing 
and explication of these differences and relations may serve to promote the raising of con­
sciousness that precedes change. The important thing, at least as an initial matter, is not to 
identify the origins of difference but to recognize the difference itself and its harmful effects. 
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texts no less than in the interpretation of literary ones. As West 
notes, despite its overwhelming predominance over the other three 
schools in the legal academy generally, the interpretive school has 
sparked little interest among feminists (pp. 203-04). This is so 
mainly because, although feminists and interpretation theorists 
share a deep common interest in the judicial decisionmaker as legal 
subject, feminists shun generalized interpretive theories in favor of 
attention to the particular factual contexts in which judges resolve 
legal disputes (pp. 204-05). The narrative school originated within 
feminism and the Critical Race Theory movement. West praises 
the power of stories to "communicate both the nature and extent" 
of overlooked societal harms in ways that quantitative data can­
not,26 as well as to replace law's "stock stories" with new perspec­
tives (p. 211). 
Chapter Four can be viewed as an exploration of some of the 
neglected harms described in Chapter Two using some of the liter­
ary tools described in Chapter Three. West finds in Herman Mel­
ville's Bartleby the Scrivener27 and Susan Glaspell's A Jury of Her 
Peers2s rare depictions of marginalized, mute victims who suffer in­
dignities so pervasive that the victims become invisible. In ignoring 
these harms, the law "is complicit in the process by which they be­
come 'legitimate"' (p. 219). It is West's claim that the two novellas 
seek not only to expose these oft-neglected harms, but to address 
"the process of legitimation itself' (p. 219). West finds in Bartleby's 
employer a man who passively participates in the legitimation of 
exploitative labor practices, not out of malice or ignorance, but be­
cause of his sheer lack of imagination and inability to "question the 
deeper premises of a system which led him and Bartleby to their 
point of crisis" (p. 242). As for Glaspell's work, West notes that 
"whereas Bartleby chronicles the system of meanings which cabin 
and constrain the charitable instincts of the powerful, Jury chroni­
cles the system of meanings which cabin and constrain and frustrate 
the political consciousness of the weak" (p. 250). West's discussion 
26. P. 208. As a matter of human psychology, West has scientific support on this score. 
Studies indicate that people may tend to give·undue weight to anecdotal evidence relative to 
overall statistical likelihoods when making decisions. See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER­
TAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11-14, 190-200, 465-72 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) 
(discussing influence of "availability heuristic" according to which vivid, easily recalled spe­
cific instances of an event lead to overestimation of its frequency); id. at 153-60, 414-21 (dis­
cussing consistently insufficient weights people assign to base-rate statistical data). 
27. P. 219. Melville seems precisely the type of canonical author or social "insider" 
whose utility as a focus of literary legal analysis West questioned in Chapter 3. West does not 
address any problems arising from her use of Bartleby, however. This might be because West 
is, as she notes, simply responding to and expanding on the work of Brook Thomas, a mem­
ber of the critical school who wrote about Bartleby. P. 219. 
28. P. 198. West also discusses A Jury of Her Peers in her examination of the shortcom­
ings of the critical project's focus on the literary canon. Pp. 198-99. 
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of subjugated and isolated women recalls her discussion of the same 
themes - and, briefly, Glaspell's book (p. 131) - in Chapter Two. 
Chapter Five treats postmodernism in much the same way that 
Chapter Three deals with law and literature: it provides synopses 
of major movements and brief commentaries on the consequences 
of those movements for feminism. West investigates four central, 
and interrelated, concerns for postmodernists: power, knowledge, 
morality, and the self. Her discussions of power and knowledge fo­
cus on Michel Foucault, whose work West criticizes for characteriz­
ing power as solely positive and creative rather than potentially 
harmful and destructive (pp. 260-62). West seeks an exploration 
not of the truths or modes of knowledge power has created, but of 
those it "has silenced, of the selves it has not allowed to be, of the 
subjectivities it has denied, of what it has forbidden, and what it has 
destroyed. "29 
With respect to morality, West asserts that the anti-hierarchical 
agenda of Roberto Unger et al. neglects the potential - some­
times, the need - to transform unequal relationships by infusing 
them with care (pp. 277-78). She also criticizes Unger's emphasis 
on discourse and opposition to the "natural," instead exhorting 
feminists "to remember, remain true to, and draw upon the natural­
ism and quietness that have always been central to what has been 
and is still most admirable about women's moral lives."3° Finally, 
West attacks postmodernism's deconstruction of the concept of the 
self. She insists that the critical task for women is to reconstruct an 
essential self after overcoming a socially constructed lack of self (p. 
291). 
The end of the book thus harkens back to the ideas expressed at 
its beginning: a declaration of the possibility of essential differences 
between men and women, and a defense of the exploration of that 
29. P. 262. In fairness to Foucault, his inattention to cultural silence was not necessarily 
the product of deliberate omission or bias, but rather a consequence of the nature of his 
analysis. Foucault's project was archaeological in that it sought to unearth socially con­
structed truths and explore their genealogical development and change. See, e.g., MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, PoLmCS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE: INTERVIEWS AND 0TIIER WRITINGS 1977-
1984, at 39, 154 (Lawrence D. Kritzman ed., Alan Sheridan et al. trans., 1988); MICHEL Fou. 
CAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTII OF TIIE PRISON 23 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979) 
(1975). As such, it was by its nature concerned with voiced rather than unspoken 
perspectives. 
Put another way, Foucault's focus was on the exercise of power itself rather than those on 
whom it is exercised. West is right, of course, to state that such a focus could well be danger­
ous for women. At the same time, however, it is probably inaccurate to characterize Fou­
cault himself as unsympathetic to concerns about the potential harmful effects of what power 
creates. 
30. P. 280. West's description of women's behavior as natural may, of course, run into the 
same antiessentialist critiques she addresses in the Introduction - specifically, the argument 
that natural differences justify women's caregiving social roles. Cf. supra note 22 and accom­
panying text (discussing complex causal relationship between caregiving roles, patriarchy, 
and ethic of care). 
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possibility against the narrow and fundamentally negative critique 
of postmodernists. West's own exploration of the differences be­
tween the sexes is broad in scope, bold in ambition, and twofold in 
nature. First, West provides a clear depiction of the concrete dis­
similarities - some intrinsic, some socially constructed - between 
men and women, and of the social consequences of these dissimilar­
ities. Second, West defends the position that the sexes' fundamen­
tal moral and intellectual perspectives differ as well. 
If true, the latter claim in particular has disquieting conse­
quences for the possibility of full mutual understanding or equality 
between the sexes; a lasting peace between Mars and Venus may be 
impossible after all. For that reason, West's work is sure to stir con­
troversy both within the feminist community and without. The 
profound implications of West's argument, however, make it all the 
more important that we take her claims seriously and explore them 
thoroughly, rather than dismissing them out of hand based on the 
casual intuition that any discussion of essential differences is dan­
gerous or discriminatory. Caring for Justice does not fully resolve 
all the issues it raises, but it powerfully highlights the significance of 
those issues and offers a compelling case for the adoption of a new 
perspective for addressing them. 
- Michael T. Cahill 
